Contrary to common presumption, we show that grandfathering of emissions permits traded in a perfectly competitive market can be used as a strategic trade instrument in the presence of transactions costs. Thus, allowing only some countries participating in an international emissions trading scheme to grandfather permits could affect shares in international markets instead of operating just as a monetary transfer.
Introduction
Increasing interest on Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) is based mainly on the expected efficiency gains derived from allocating abatement effort to the lowest cost facilities. Countries participating in an international ETS receive a number of permits that may, in turn, either auction, or grant to their domestic firms (grandfathering).
Therefore, in international product markets, competitors may have been treated differently by their governments. Mixed schemes where some governments use auctioning and other grandfathering may exist even within the same trading block: the plan for the EU ETS's third trading period in 2013, includes a progressive move towards auctioning, allowing grandfathering in selective sectors and participating countries. This raises the question whether granted permits affect market performance and provide the receivers with strategic advantage over permits purchasing rivals. The layman's presumption is that it does indeed, yet economic theory treats grandfathered permits as pure transfers. A competitive permits market creates an opportunity cost to the use of a permit equal to its market value; therefore a firm uses the same number of permits whether it buys them at an auction or receives them for free.
We address this question by introducing transactions costs in a competitive permits market. Concerns over the importance of transaction costs in ETS have been raised by a number of theoretical works supported by empirical evidence. 1 Stavins (1995) and Montero (1996) incorporated transactions costs into the basic permits model to establish that cost efficiency conditions are violated. These papers examine the impact transactions costs have on the efficiency of permits market, while the present paper focuses on whether transactions costs allow governments to use permits strategically.
We find that transactions costs, by writing-off part of the selling revenue from a permit, reduce its opportunity cost, thus encouraging its use in production. Granting a number of permits to a firm is equivalent to offering that firm a unit cost reduction.
This reduction differs from a classical subsidy in that a) the amount of the per-unit reduction is exogenous, determined by the level of transactions costs, and b) it can be applied to a selective number of units. In that respect, grandfathering permits corresponds to offering firms pre-established capacity.
The model
Assume a domestic and a foreign firm exporting their entire production of a homogeneous good to a third country, where they compete in quantities (Cournot duopoly 
where T P denotes the emissions permits' price. permits are a pure transfer to the firm leaving its output decision unaffected.
ETS and international trade
Assume now that while entry into the permits market is costless ( 0 T  ) there is a cost t per permit exchanged. For simplicity, let this cost only be borne by the seller. This creates a gap between the market price T P and the net price the seller receives,
Assume further that the home country grandfathers a number d e of permits to its domestic producer, while the foreign country auctions all its available permits. The domestic producer abates until ( ) 
Note that d e reduces the domestic firm's marginal cost for output levels ,
granted permits are no longer pure transfer since they may affect output decisions.
2 Analytically, nothing changes if we add transactions costs on permits' purchases. Then, 
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Contrary to the no transactions-cost case, increasing the number of granted permits shifts the equilibrium to the right, along the foreign firm's reaction function. Thus, transactions costs transform grandfathered permits, from pure transfers, to subsidy-like stimulants. 3 We assume that the foreign country's auction price is also T P . 4 The full solution of the Cournot game is available by the authors.
While similar in their effects, free-permits and subsidies have some important differences. When using a subsidy the government chooses the amount of reduction in the firms' marginal cost, this reduction applying universally on all exported units (see the doted curve on Fig. 2a) . When grandfathering permits, the amount of the marginal-cost reduction is determined exogenously by t, but the government has discretion over the number of units this reduction applies to. Analytically, grandfathering permits is closer to what is known in the Industrial Organization literature as "capacity constraints" (see Tirole 1988, p. 228-34) hand, move the entire R d (see Fig 2a) making any point on R f attainable as equilibrium. Hence, for any number of permits granted to a firm it is always possible to find a "subsidy equivalent," but the reverse is not true. Given that t is not very large, the scope of strategically grandfathering permits is relatively limited, compared to subsidizing. It represents, however, a more discreet way to help domestic firms gain international market share.
When both countries adopt grandfathering, f R becomes similar to d R . For given t assuming that both governments grant the same amount of permits to their firm, the new equilibrium will be on the 45 0 line at point t E . Since already at E total output is more than the cooperative output, its further increase to t E implies even lower profits: by competing in grandfathering permits, the two governments transfer wealth to the consumers in the third country. While auctioning permits is obviously superior, the two governments are trapped into a prisoner's dilemma.
Let us now assume 0 t  but 0 T  . For a firm that participates in the permits market the opportunity cost of using an extra permit is equal to the entire value of the permit, hence, grandfathering yields no strategic effects. On the other hand, if a firm finds it unprofitable to enter the permits market, the opportunity cost of its grandfathered permits becomes zero. For as long as the firm stays out of the permits market, this is equivalent to having 0 T  but T t P  , and the previous analysis applies with a vengeance: not only a part, but the entire value of a grandfathered permit has a subsidy-like effect. Determining the conditions for participation in the permits market when 0 T  is a rather complex issue, left out due to space limitations. Three important factors affecting this decision are: the amount of grandfathered permits, the price of the output, and the relative size of individual firms. Large amounts of permits grandfathered to a firm may induce its participation in the permits market, thus cancelling all the expected strategic effects. Also, firms with large share in their output market are ceteris paribus more likely to participate in the permits market.
Hence, a number of permits widely distributed in a sector with small firms may have strategic impact, while the same number concentrated in the hands of large firms may constitute pure transfer.
Summary and Conclusions
Transactions costs reduce the opportunity cost of using an already acquired permit.
Based on this, we provide theoretical support to the layman's presumption that grandfathering of emission permits can be used as a strategic trade instrument, even if the market of permits is perfectly competitive. While a single-country adopting free distribution of its permits helps its firms to gain market share in the international market over rival firms from countries where permits are auctioned, multilateral adoption of grandfathering leads all firms to lower profits. This offers some explanation to international agreements requiring that permits be auctioned. While we examined the case of transactions costs per unit of output, the above conclusions may be robust in cases where the main bulk of transactions cost is a fixed marketparticipation fee.
Referee Appendix
In Figure 2 , the two segments OA and BC correspond to the situation in which the domestic firm engages in abatement and their slope equals 3. The segments AB and CF correspond to the case that firm uses its permits' endowment and to the case it purchases permits from the market respectively, and their slope equals 2. Notice that the foreign firm's marginal cost and reaction functions remain the same as in the case of zero transaction costs. The slope of the foreign firm's reaction function is either 1 3 or 1 2 . This implies that any segment of the domestic firm's reaction function is steeper than any segment of the foreign firm's reaction function which, in turn, implies that there are no multiple intersections, and therefore there exist no multiple equilibria.
The Cournot equilibrium quantities of this game crucially depend of two parameters: the transactions cost per unit of permits, t , and the number of permits granted to the domestic firm, d e . We distinguish between two cases, according to whether transactions cost is high or low, i.e.,
o Region IIa-i: when
o Region IIb: when
The above constitutes the full solution of the Cournot game provided that 4 T a P  .
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In order to see the role of permits as a strategic trade instrument, let us consider the t S  case. Condition (0.5) defines a minimum amount of permits, equal to 3 S , below which permits granted to the domestic firm have no strategic value. However, the equilibrium solution in Region IIb (equations (0.9)) shows that within the specified limits, increases in grandfathered permits increase monotonically the output of the domestic firm and reduce monotonically the output of the rival firm. Finally, in Region IIIb equilibrium output (Eq. (0.10)) of neither firm is affected by increasing the number of grandfathered permits. The equilibrium represented by (0.10), however, is asymmetric, with the domestic firm producing more output than its rival. The difference in output ( 3t ) is proportional to the level of transactions cost. When t S  the analysis remains essentially the same, except that Region II is now breaking in two parts, IIa-i and IIa-ii. While the functional form of equilibrium outcomes changes from one sub-region to the other, the qualitative result, namely that an increase in permits increases domestic firm's output while reducing that of the foreign firm, remains. The marginal impact of this effect is reduced in Region IIa-ii relative to
Region IIa-i. In terms of Figure 2 this implies that when t S  the equilibrium may fall on the BC segment of R d .
